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Borat in an Age
of Postironic Deconstruction
Antonio López
Taboo, Spring-Summer-Fall-Winter 2007
The power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, 
and accepting both of them. ... To tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in 
them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then, when it becomes 
necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed, 
to deny the existence of objective reality and all the while to take account of the 
reality which one denies—all this is indispensably necessary. Even in using the 
word doublethink it is necessary to exercise doublethink. For by using the word 
one admits that one is tampering with reality; by a fresh act of doublethink one 
erases this knowledge; and so on indefinitely, with the lie always one leap ahead 
of the truth.
—George Orwell, 19841
I will speak to you in plain, simple English. And that brings us to tonight’s word: 
‘truthiness.’ Now I’m sure some of the ‘word police,’ the ‘wordinistas’ over at 
Webster’s are gonna say, ‘hey, that’s not really a word.’ Well, anyone who knows me 
knows I’m no fan of dictionaries or reference books. I don’t trust books. They’re 
all fact, no heart. And that’s exactly what’s pulling our country apart today. ‘Cause 
face it, folks; we are a divided nation. Not between Democrats and Republicans, 
or conservatives and liberals, or tops and bottoms. No, we are divided between 
those who think with their head, and those who know with their heart.
—Stephen Colbert, The Colbert Report2
 At first they appeared to be innocent Lite Brite kits assembled by mischievous 
teens. Placed in various locations across the greater Boston area as a guerrilla 
marketing campaign for the adult cartoon show Aqua Teen Hunger Force, it’s hard 
to conceive that these simple magnetic devices with batteries, duct tape, and LEDs 
would launch a hysterical terrorisms scare by city authorities. Summing up the gulf 
of reaction between the establishment and the pop culture public, on the YouTube 
page featuring a video of the guerrilla marketers in action, one observer in the 
comments area stated, “Just to clue you in: Bombs are traditionally not covered in 
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LEDs which trace out the shape of a cartoon moon person giving you the middle 
finger. Generally, as terrorists don’t want their bomb plots foiled, they tend not to 
decorate their bombs in bright lights advertising their presence and then leave them 
lying around for weeks.”3
 Yes, in retrospect the overreaction by Boston authorities does seem severe. 
But they are to be forgiven, somewhat, for being baffled by the cultural lexicon 
trafficked by marketers. In the ensuing days of the event, even pundits were hav-
ing a difficult time labeling the action, ranging in superlatives such as “a terrorist 
hoax,” “prank,” “viral campaign,” “publicity stunt,” “marketing stunt,” “ad lights,” 
and “’non-terrorist’ embarrassment in Boston” (Weaver, 2007, paragraph 11). Not 
surprisingly, the operation resulted in the Cartoon Network chief’s resignation, 
but despite the fall-out (not the radioactive kind) the show still managed a ratings 
spike. In the end, it’s the parent company, Turner Broadcasting, a subsidiary of Time 
Warner Inc., who profited the most. It was probably well worth the $2 million they 
paid to Boston for the trouble. To paraphrase an ancient Chinese curse, “May you 
live in confusing times.”
 In an era when fake news is real news and real news is fake, it’s getting more 
difficult to discern what is commentary, propaganda, or a sales pitch. Even our 
random conversations threaten to be infected with the viral advertising practice of 
peer-to-peer marketing. This is what happens when a culture smuggles persuasion 
techniques in “postirony,” the simulacra of irony in which phrases are merely signs 
of sardonic currency, but are vacated of any political or critical content. Postirony 
is the embrace of contradictory ideologies as normal, acceptable, and desirable. 
It’s kitsch cognitive dissonance. It’s a wink to political consciousness while simul-
taneously discarding it. It’s Neil Postman’s idea that we are entertaining ourselves 
to death, but with the clipped smile of a Republican used car salesmen who just 
completed Newt Gingrich’s seminar on How to Become a Bolshevik Operative in 
the American Political System. It’s Gen X cynicism gone horribly astray. It’s the 
droll, expressionless face of Bill Murray in Lost in Translation and Broken Flowers, 
and is so deeply imbedded into the vernacular of advanced technological societies, 
few are conscious of it.
 Examples abound, such as war critics viewing a highly disparaging parody like 
Team America as an indictment of the War on Terror, while wingnut warmongers 
simultaneously embrace it as a symbol of patriotism. Or Mars, Inc., can launch 
a Snickers viral Web campaign whose hip hop protagonists battle an evil record 
company selling out African American youth, but in reality the parent company 
allegedly engages in exploitative child labor practices in Africa to produce its candy. 
And then there are the misogynistic BudLight ads that discretely promote alcoholic 
behavior while telling us to “drink responsibly.” None of this is surprising given 
that marketers and their “marks” inhabit a violent, repressive world empire that is 
also supposed to be a democracy. Talk about doublethink. In the Age of Postirony, 
war is peace because who cares about constitutionally challenged militarism or a 
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mediated political system as long as at the end of the day the numbers on the stock 
exchange board still climb.
 All this is exacerbated by the business of doing business. That is, we live in a 
commodities system with a media traditionally driven by advertising. The problem 
is that models are changing, and so too are consumers, especially one of the most 
coveted demographics: teens. Take, for example, the following description for 
a marketing industry conference attempting to unlock the mysteries of the teen 
market, called “What Teens Want”: 
Teens are wired different than any another consumer group. They navigate 
through media clutter with a heightened “BS” meter to sniff out hidden advertis-
ing agendas. In a post-scarcity media world, there is no shortage of brands or 
media pipeline channels. Attention is the new scarcity. Loyalty, trust and affinity 
become the new pipeline. When there is so much choice, what is the new role of 
earned attention?4
The curious word here is “attention,” because as we’ll see, it was the problem of 
attention in the first place that created a cultural climate in which “cool” became 
the flattened emotion of knowledge work, with “postirony” as its current lexicon. 
Given that irony has been a potent tool of social criticism, it remains to be seen 
if such a strategy can still work. By using Sasha Cohen’s Borat character as a 
case study, we’ll examine how irony may still be possible in an age of postironic 
deconstruction.
Doublethink Trouble, Doublemint Gum
 It may be useful to think of postirony as the postmodern equivalent of George 
Orwell’s (1990 [1949]) “doublethink.” Consider the following passage from 1984,
His mind slid away into the labyrinthine world of doublethink. To know and not to 
know, to be conscious of complete truthfulness while telling carefully-constructed 
lies, to hold simultaneously two opinions which cancelled out, knowing them to be 
contradictory and believing in both of them; to use logic against logic, to repudiate 
morality while laying claim to it, to believe that democracy was impossible and that 
the Party was the guardian of democracy; to forget whatever it was necessary to 
forget, then to draw it back at the moment when it was needed, and then promptly 
to forget it again: and above all, to apply the same process to the process itself. 
That was the ultimate subtlety: consciously to induce unconsciousness, and then, 
once again, to become unconscious of the art of hypnosis you had just performed. 
Even to understand the word ‘doublethink’ involved using doublethink. (p. 35)
Now compare this passage with the following from Alex Shakar’s (2002) novel, 
The Savage Girl,
…Our culture has become so saturated with ironic doubt that it’s beginning to 
doubt its own mode of doubting. If everything is false, then by the same token 
anything can be taken as true, or at least as true enough. Truths are no longer 
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absolute; they’re shifting, temporary, whatever serves the purpose of the mo-
ment. Postironists create their own sets of serviceable realities and live in them 
independent of any facets of the outside world that they choose to ignore….
Practitioners of postironic consciousness blur the boundaries between irony and 
earnestness in ways we traditional ironists can barely understand, creating a state 
of consciousness wherein critical and uncritical responses are indistinguishable. 
Postirony seeks not to demystify but to befuddle, not to synthesize opposites 
but to suspend them, keeping open all possibilities at once. And we marketers, 
in forging a viable mode of postironic consumerism, must seek to foster in the 
consumer a mystical relationship with consumption. Through consumption 
consumers will be gods; outside of consumption they will be nothing: a per-
petual oscillation between absolute control and absolute vulnerability, between 
grandeur and persecution. (p. 140)
Postirony is a strategy to deal with cognitive dissonance, a condition when one 
simultaneously possesses contradictory beliefs that result in mental noise. Like 
doublethink, postirony is a defense and a control strategy, but unlike in 1984, I 
don’t believe postirony was consciously constructed as a master strategy for mind 
control, but evolved as a result of an emotional tactic for the workplace to become 
a market language. 
 Irony can still be one of the primary forms of mental resistance against double-
think because it is through an ironic disposition one can distance herself from the 
ambient realm of misinformation and marketing. This underlies my weak theory of 
why dark humor is prevalent in Great Britain. I believe the one way a population can 
cope with becoming a decrepit and dying world military power is through sardonic 
humor. Monty Python is the best anecdote for imperial impotence, or the cross-dress-
ing comic Eddie Izzard. As Shakespeare demonstrated repeatedly, the court jester was 
the only person permitted to speak truth to power without getting his head chopped 
off. Sadly, modern societies don’t employ tricksters in high office, but our corporate 
media abound with them. Consider John Stewart, Stephen Colbert, and now Cohen, 
a Brit. In modern parlance, they speak “truthiness to power.”
 Within postirony there is a space where interventions can disrupt internal 
paradoxes to form a kind of empowering dialectic. Comedian Colbert’s term 
“truthiness,” for example, has entered the zeitgeist because it so precisely mirrors 
the contradictory situation of infotainment as news we’re dealing with. It’s an 
update of the newspeak term “bellyfeel,” which describes an intuitive belief that 
belies logic, but truthiness, because it is satire and thereby politically safe, pierces 
the liminal zone of noisy dissonance to clarify the manner in which news is now 
packaged in mainstream media, tricky business, to be sure. 
 Such strategies are difficult to contrive. Look no further than Fox News’ “irony 
deficient” rightwing counterpunch, The 1/2 Hour News Hour, which fails to muster 
even a snort with its canned laughter and inability to maneuver postirony, because, 
unlike media critics, they are the party-member analog of 1984 who are so enmeshed 
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with doublethink, they can’t navigate its treacherous realm with authenticity. As 
the blogger Plaid Adder notes,
Irony has been defined many different ways, but the definition I think works best 
here is that irony is what we see when we contemplate the gap between what ap-
pears to be and what is, and/or the gap between what is and what ought to be. The 
main project of The Daily Show is to satirize the media; and because the media 
are responsible for creating perception, and because the perception created by the 
media has lately become massively and outrageously divergent from anything one 
might call reality, and because reality right now just sucks so hard, every aspect 
of The Daily Show is about irony.5
The 1/2 Hour News Hour is trying a complex ninja move when trying to parody 
the parody, and fails because, as Addeler explains, the key to successful humor is 
in deriding authority, not underdogs:
Mocking the powerful has the positive effect of reminding everyone that though 
these figures may be powerful, they are not superhuman, and can be resisted/out-
witted/defied; it also has the therapeutic effect of validating the anger and pain 
we feel as we suffer for these people, and reminding us that in fact, it’s not us, 
it’s them. Mocking the vulnerable is just bullying, and all it does is pander to the 
audience’s worst instincts. Right-wing pundits in the main either don’t understand 
this rule, or have a seriously warped understanding of who’s vulnerable and who’s 
powerful. Take, for instance, Rush Limbaugh’s hilarious impression of Michael J. 
Fox on Parkinson’s medication. What made him think that was funny? Did it remind 
him of when he was a boy and they all used to band together on the playground 
to torment the kid with cerebral palsy? Or in his mind, is Michael J. Fox a servant 
of some vast international conspiracy of Parkinson’s sufferers out to destroy all 
that is good in the world?6
Still, the lack of an effective ironic approach from conservatives seems odd consider-
ing that rightwing humor can be some of the most biting, as in the T-shirt with the 
phrase, “This shirt brought to you by capitalism,” accompanying a photo of Che. 
The key point is that for irony to work, it has to reveal some kind of innate truth, 
such as bullying by authorities, or hypocrisy. Without a moral compass, it is just 
another stream of humorless “weasel words” recycled from the PR industry.
 Irony is also a finicky tool because you run the risk of going over people’s 
heads or outright offending them. Remember Lenny Bruce? In the epoch of Na-
tional Security Agency keyword filters trying to ferret out terrorists on the Web, or 
humorless Homeland Security officials assembling watch lists, words are powerful 
markers of patriotic infidelity, but taken out of context, black—or sardonic—humor 
can be totally misunderstood. Ironically (!), this could even have an adverse effect 
on the most pro-war of our society. Take, for instance, the Green Beret motto, “Kill 
‘em all, let God sort ‘em out.” If you were a computer program, how would you 
interpret the motives of the phrase’s authors? 
 It takes a deft trickster to deploy irony as a critical weapon when as a cultural 
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rhetorical practice it has become so commonplace it fails to rise above the din of 
absurdity. So it remains to be seen if Jewish comic Cohen’s anti-Semitic Borat, the 
bumbling pumpkin who must navigate his way through the treacherous landmines 
of New York snobbery and Middle American prejudice, is a combatant in the global 
psych warfare of postironic marketing, or is just an ingenious clown exploiting 
weaknesses in the moral character of flawed people. After all, Cohen is just a 
comic, right? A few things clue us in that Borat may indeed be an insurgent. The 
Borat character is a TV reporter, i.e., a member of the media, and is also a refugee 
of modernity’s forgotten realm. That is, his character is not a child of the Internet, 
but rather of the Second World, which was obliterated by the termination of the 
Cold War. In pre-9/11 literature on media activism, 1989 is considered a watershed 
because it is at that moment “modernity” finally collapsed (represented by the end 
of the battle between world behemoths, U. S. and USSR). It’s when we “officially” 
enter the age of neo-liberal globalization. But multiple “modernities” still exist. 
Not everyone is wired into the techno-realm of the U. S. and Europe, and it is from 
this perspective that Borat seeks to be a tour guide (with a 1917 map of the U. S., 
no less!). In doing so, he is an insurrectionary caricature who becomes an agent of 
the transition from an isolated power grid to global nomadism. He’s training us how 
to be productive citizens, and hence modernized workers, in the global economy. 
But before we probe deeper into his methods, we are still like proverbial fish that 
do not know the sea; we must explore this illusorily territory of marketing cool as 
if it were the foreign land that Borat reports from. How as cultural reporters would 
we map the territory?
Psychological Warfare—Infowars—Ontological Warfare
 For McLuhan, media content was like the meat thrown to the guard dogs. It’s 
just a way to divert attention from the actual changes that media forms have been 
making on our perception. So beyond the mirror shades of cool are more insidious 
conclusions made by German media theorists and French philosopher Paul Virillio. 
As reported by Geert Lovink (2003), there is a school of thought that underlying all 
media strategies is militarism. “Media from now on are merely spin-off products 
of the military that basically deal with the war of perception. The rest is merely 
noise” (p. 26). Not surprisingly, the flipside is that the “trauma” of the Second 
World War produced modern media criticism. “War is the father of all media, 
and the founding fathers of media theory are Heidegger and Benjamin (McLuhan 
being a good third)” (p. 27). Disinformation and war are the key to our historical 
moment because it is the propaganda environment that sets the tone of our social 
and economic system. The concern is that underlying all our decisions is a deeply 
embedded consumerism at the service of a war economy, and militarism shoring 
up and expanding the “free” market:
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The Big Digital Bang is threatening to crush (or “liberate”) all meaning, to keep 
every cry against injustice out of the broadcasting range. That’s at least the fear of 
a group—perhaps a diminishing group—for whom “media” means more than just 
a job processing other people’s data. But through this data smog and processing 
fog, the lessons of the Cold War were learned and universalized: through this haze 
of the “media” we see the vague outlines and traces of invisible psychological 
warfare, without clear fronts and with a low-intensity paranoid conflicts on the 
horizons. Infowar precludes the friend-enemy distinction, which according to Carl 
Schmitt, forms the basis of politics. (Lovink, 2003, p. 307)
 In CIA parlance, propaganda campaigns are “playing the Grand Wurlitzer,” 
i.e., keying all the right notes to generate a grand campaign of information that is 
more akin to noise than music. Curiously, there is something a bit old school (and 
dare we say Borat-ish?) about the image of a Wurlitzer organ. What comes to mind 
are silent movies (in which directed visuals merely require a soundtrack), skating 
rinks (in which we as citizens are to mindlessly lap in circles), churches (again 
an environment where our behaviors are orchestrated), or funerals (no comment 
necessary). So why noise? There are two kinds of propaganda: black and gray. 
Black propaganda is an outright lie, as in, “Saddam Hussein is responsible for 
9-11.” Gray propaganda is a lie that contains an element of truth to make it more 
believable, such as, “there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.” Granted the 
reality quotient here is minuscule, but because there was a history of WMDs in the 
past, its potentiality makes the idea feasible. The philosopher Robert Anton Wilson 
was fond of saying that 25% of political information is true; we just don’t know 
which part. What makes gray propaganda effective is that it distorts and confuses 
issues, and also puts people on the defensive. Think of the “Swift boating” of John 
Kerry’s presidential campaign. It muddled and distorted key elements of Kerry’s 
character, making it a distraction that ultimately hurt his image and detracted from 
the discussion of issues. If you compare this with CIA led-operations in Third 
World countries over the past 50 years, you’d see similar tactics used to discredit 
politicians who were out of favor with Washington’s policy goals.
 Borat toys with America’s unconscious militarism when he performs at the 
Salem rodeo. To great cheers he amps up the cruelty of war: “We support your 
war of terror… May ‘Supreme Warlord’ George W. Bush drink the blood of every 
single man, woman, and child of Iraq… May you destroy their country so that 
for the next thousand years, not even a single lizard will survive in their desert!” 
At first the crowd cheers, but as the statements get bloodier, they are increasingly 
confused. Did he really say that? Is that what we really think?
Fugitive Poseurs: Origins of Postirony
 Native American writer Gerald Visner postulates that Indians compartmental-
ize an internalized caricature of themselves, which manifests as a “fugitive pose.” 
Treated as internal enemies in their own lands, Native Americans have had to develop 
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mental strategies to combat spiritual and psychic colonization through a defensive 
posture that is unemotional and distant. Indigenous people are typically the first 
to bear the brunt of “enclosure,” the systematic practice of capitalist restructuring 
that in essence smashes land-based cultures like bags of dry clay, then remolds 
them into the system of commodities. It’s not just a matter of turning people into 
workers, but it’s restructuring their spatiotemporal reality. With enclosure comes 
“the loss of traditional culture bearings: the emergence of a sense anomie associ-
ated with the loss of a stable and cyclical cultural life” (Andrejevic, p. 30).
 This gives pause to the concept of “early adapters,” which is usually reserved 
for those heroic individuals of the capitalist avant-garde that innovate new technol-
ogy, invent edgy software or develop new styles. The real early adapters are those 
who have figured out how to maneuver around mind control and colonization of 
their souls that results from the embedding of capitalist ideology into the entire 
thought universe of a society. In the case of Native culture, humor is one of many 
strategies. In the Native American written and directed movie, Smoke Signals, 
there’s a humorous scene that plays with the fugitive pose: 
Victor Joseph: You gotta look mean or people won’t respect you. White people 
will run all over you if you don’t look mean. You gotta look like a warrior! You 
gotta look like you just came back from killing a buffalo!
Thomas Builds-the-Fire: But our tribe never hunted buffalo—we were fisher-
men.
Victor Joseph: What! You want to look like you just came back from catching a 
fish? This ain’t “Dances With Salmon” you know!
 If the fugitive pose evolved out of a historical situation in which Native Ameri-
cans were systematically relocated from their tribal lands and assimilated into the 
thought system of the colonizers through boarding schools (“Kill the Indian, save 
the man” was the educational slogan of the day), it should be noted that in the late 
1800s there was a popular genre of “abduction” literature in which White female 
colonists were kidnapped by “savages.” After entering an alien world, they return 
altered. Vizner notes that there is some similarity between these stories and modern 
alien abduction myths. The connection I see relates to the ambient environment of 
the new technological society that produced both of these “hysterias”; these stories 
exist in an environment in which there is a prevailing sense of dislocation resulting 
from new technology. Since the invention of electricity and the telegraph, traditional 
notions of place and self have been radically disrupted. In both cases—abduction 
literature of the 1800s and that of the aliens at the end of the 20th Century—ac-
cording to common literary tropes the most “innocent” of our society, women, were 
being forced through alien sexuality to reproduce hybrids. It is my contention that 
there is a deep cultural anxiety about the radical shift in perception brought about 
by mechanical reproduction (a sexual metaphor, if you think about it). As cybernetic 
hybrids, we, too, require a fugitive pose.7
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 Consequently, there are a few things worth noting about the “turn” that media 
technology brought about in the 19th Century. One is the sense that recording 
technology, as media scholar Mary Ann Doane (2002) has noted, became a means 
to contain catastrophe and time.
The rationalization of time characterizing industrialization and the expansion 
of capitalism was accompanied by a structuring of contingency and temporality 
through emerging technologies of representation—a structuring that attempted 
to ensure their residence outside structure, to make tolerable an incessant ra-
tionalization. Such a strategy is not designed simply to deal with the leakage 
or by-product of rationalization; it is structurally necessary to the ideologies of 
capitalist modernization. (p. 11)
The second is what media archeologist Jonathan Crary (2001) interprets is the 
double bind of perception. This, he says, results from conflicting modes of mental 
engagement originally required of industrial work’s tight focus and the multisensory 
shock created by exploding urban environments and new media. This is at the root 
of our contemporary predominance, if not false, diagnosis of ADD:
In a culture that is so relentlessly founded on a short attention span, on the logic of 
the nonsequitur, on perceptual overload, on the generalized ethic of ‘getting ahead,’ 
and on the celebration of aggressiveness, it is nonsensical to pathologize these forms 
of behavior or look for the causes of this imaginary disorder in neurochemistry, 
brain anatomy, and genetic predisposition… [T]he behavior categorized as ADD 
is merely one of many manifestations resulting from this cultural double bind, 
from the contradictory modes of performance and cognition that are continually 
demanded or incited. (p. 36-7)
He further laments the “the sweeping use of potent neurochemicals as a strategy 
of behavior management” (p. 37).
 Perhaps “fugitive” maybe too strong a word, because fugitive implies a self-
knowing subject engaged in an act of exile, a conscious running from the system. 
It may be more accurate to describe the modern cyborg as a “fugue,” someone who 
wonders in a narcoleptic state. This is closer to the dangers of the increasingly over 
stimulated media environment warned of by McLuhan. In his re-working of the 
Narcissus myth, rather than being enraptured by our reflection, McLuhan (2002) 
says that just as media technology expand our senses, we extend ourselves into 
our mediated reflection. In the process we “autoamputate”—we numb the parts of 
ourselves that get over-stimulated, yet we stimulate ourselves further just so we can 
feel something. Like screeching guitar feedback gone awry, the result is getting 
trapped within an iterating loop:
The Greek myth of Narcissus is directly concerned with a fact of human experience, 
as the word Narcissus indicates. It is from the Greek word narcosis, or numbness. 
The youth Narcissus mistook his own reflection in the water for another person. 
This extension of himself by mirror numbed his perceptions until he became the 
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servomechanism of his own extended or repeated image. The nymph Echo tried 
to win his love with fragments of his own speech, but in vain. He was numb. He 
had adapted to his extension of himself and had become a closed system…. Now 
the point of this myth is the fact that men at once become fascinated by any exten-
sion of themselves in any material other than themselves. There have been cynics 
who insisted that men fall deepest in love with women who give them back their 
own image. Be that as it may, the wisdom of the Narcissus myth does not convey 
any idea that Narcissus fell in love with anything he regarded as himself. Obvi-
ously he would have had very different feelings about the image had he known 
it was an extension or repetition of himself. It is, perhaps, indicative of the bias 
of our intensely technological and, therefore, narcotic culture that we have long 
interpreted the Narcissus story to mean that he fell in love with himself, that he 
imagined the reflection to be Narcissus! (pp. 41-2)
I take this as a valid explanation for why films and television are increasingly more 
violent and more sexual while incorporating faster edits, and are developing more 
complex plotlines. I predict that future films will be five minutes at the most; anything 
longer will just be too slow for our over-stimulated, multitasking society (YouTube 
and the “media snacker” mentality has almost brought us there alrady).
 Not surprisingly, artists surfing the edges of these societal shifts at the end of 
the 19th Century began to change their practices from representing external objects 
to describing psychological states. Consequently, by WWI two significant cultural 
developments manifested in the fine arts. First, mass media became the subject of 
paintings with the literal incorporation of newspaper headlines (The Futurists), 
or by the physical collaging of newsprint (Picasso). Secondly, Dada and Surreal-
ism emerged to create an absurdist dialectic with mass culture. Satire became 
the primary rhetorical tools for commenting on the contradictions of modernity, 
especially in light of the carnage produced by the First World War, but also from 
the dehumanizing and mind-numbing impact of industrialization. Additionally, 
thinkers like Freud and Jung popularized the idea of dreams and unconsciousness, 
enabling artists to incorporate the new vocabulary of juxtaposition as a tool for 
social criticism. The quintessential example is Magritte’s “Treachery of Images” 
featuring the infamous pipe with the inscribed French phrase, “This is not a pipe.” 
Magritte was commenting on our propensity to mistake reproductions with the 
things themselves. This is a byproduct of how mechanically reproduced arts create 
another double bind of having to simultaneously embrace an image as a thing, and 
its dual condition of the thing represented. That artists would now be questioning 
the fundamental principles of language—visual and print—indicates a growing 
unease with the instability of meaning of normal discourse.
 Not only does irony emerge in Surrealism as a way to cope with having to 
contain different modes of perception simultaneously, double binds requiring 
complex mental acrobatics become currency in the emergence of American cool, 
especially in the dialog of film noire and later with the guise of post-WWII aviator 
glasses reflecting the world back at us. Alan Liu (2004) argues that “cool” is how 
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culture deals with the flattening of emotion required of a Taylorized workforce. The 
“Fordization of the face” symbolized the emotionless assembly line worker who 
could be fired for smiling. The smoothing and management of worker emotions 
was further codified as we transformed from an industrial economy to one based 
on knowledge work, and the invention of a white-collar middle class. “For better 
or for worse, a good firm has one structure of feeling” (Liu, p. 125).
 Liu further explains that cultural “cool” became a way of enclosing (or displac-
ing, really) dissent, and creating a feedback system, muck like the one described 
by McLuhan, in which cool could be a perpetual motion machine that serves as a 
kind of emotional restraint system.
The contradiction in looking to high-tech consumer culture for refuge from the 
knowledge work that produces such culture is not lost on the cool themselves. 
Their response to the contradiction—at once their fiercest, most genuine critique 
to date and the symptom of a profound defeat—is irony, our great contemporary 
‘Fordization of the face’… Even when knowledge workers have graduated and gone 
to work, ‘cool’ is how they instantly retreat to their mental ‘room’ instead of joining 
the broader, public history of peoples resistant to rationalization. (p. 305)
I Saw the Best Minds of My Generation
Starving Hysterical Sardonic at the Postirony of Dawn
 Still, traversing the margins of this space of cool were the subcultures that acted 
as capitalist escape valves. Fluxus, Yippies, Situationists, and punks all deployed 
irony, hoaxing, and pranking as tools for social criticism and activism. As the pro-
genitor of Gen X, punk brought irony to its critical apex and then wiped it out. I 
should know, because I was there. Having grown up in the post-1960s hangover of 
Los Angeles, many of my generational ilk graduated from the pop psychology of 
the 1970s to a haze of nuclear holocaust dreams and Ronald Reagan. Like many 
of my peers, we started out as skaters navigating the concrete ruins of suburbia 
and then matriculated to the slam-a-thons of hardcore punk. In Los Angeles (and 
elsewhere in the technological world), punk’s primary aesthetic was appropriation 
and irony. We stole from every avant-garde movement known in the 20th Century 
and regurgitated them with a very dark strain of humor. Consider the names of 
artist and bands of the era: Dead Kennedys, Jello Biafra, Diana Cancer, etc. We 
utterly believed that hippies had failed to make the revolution and we were left 
with the tattered shreds of ineffective social protest and ecological apocalypse. In 
retrospect, this was a skewed view, but this is how things seemed in 1980. 
 Unfortunately, as a social movement punk failed as well. For one it substituted 
one dysfunctional family for another. Drugs, alcohol, and violence were constant 
reminders of our psychological frailty. But more importantly, our logic was nihilistic. 
The movement was so cynical it could cease to believe anything anymore. Sadly, 
this may have become one of our cultural legacies: the one thing that got adapted 
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by the culture of marketing was punk’s postmodern pastiche aesthetic, and cynical 
irony. But it’s one thing to use irony as tool for social critique and sensibility, and 
another as an advertising technique. Like French cheese, irony remains authentic 
and alive as long as you don’t refrigerate it.
Authenticity in the Mirror World Colonies
 Generally when I encounter any official statements made by government officials, 
I assume that the opposite is true. In some ways we live in a mirror world. When you 
stare at your reflection, left is right, and right is left. Trouble is, we often mistake the 
reflection for reality. This is what Socrates decried when he said any wizard could 
perform the simple trick of imitating the world: just hold up a mirror. The ancient 
Aztecs of Mexico understood this. Tezcatlipoca, AKA Smoking Mirror, was a god 
of war, illusions, and the dark arts, and was primarily accessed through obsidian mir-
rors. In an interesting historical twist, the precursor to film, phantasmagoria, were 
19th Century performances created with a mix of smoke and mirror. Reflections and 
refractions, especially when you point mirrors at each other, can trick perception, 
something we call in less polite circles, mind fucking. Unfortunately there is no better 
phrase to describe the mediated reality we maneuver on a daily basis. 
 Having grown up in the border region of the Southwestern United States, I have 
been interacting with border culture my entire life. Over the past years I’ve seen an 
interesting transition take place in which a population that traditionally has strong 
resistant strains in its mental make-up to be immune to “mind fucking,” is trying 
desperately to avoid the brainwashing that has so thoroughly pervaded its north-
ern neighbors. One of the strategies is an aesthetic practice called rasquachismo. 
Roughly translated as “kitch appropriation,” it’s a folk art practice that reconfigures 
invasive pop culture. Imagine Bart Simpson with a poncho, the Starbucks label with 
Poncho Villa instead of a mermaid, or the Nintendo logo becoming “No Intiendo” 
(“I don’t understand”). The U. S. and Canadian analog would be culture jamming. 
For rasquachismo wit is paramount: it’s that ability to laugh at our folly to make 
it bearable. This was the insight that makes Stranger in a Strange Land’s (1991) 
hybrid alien-human protagonist learn to laugh: the tragedy of others is ultimately 
what makes us giggle. Michael the Martian-human says after an epiphany, people 
“laugh because it hurts... because it’s the only thing that’ll make it stop hurting... 
The goodness is in the laughing. I grok it is a bravery...and a sharing...against pain 
and sorrow and defeat” (p. 387-8).
 For Mexicans, humor is a matter of survival. Being cultural hybrids themselves, 
Mexicans are dealing with dual modes of consciousness from their European and 
indigenous ancestors. As they are being integrated into the global marketplace, 
now they are contending with NAFTA, Wal-Mart, and Taco Bell. As one worker 
building the first McDonalds in the northern Mexican state of Zacatecas says of 
his El Norte-loving brother, 
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Every head is a world… There’s the head of McDonald, the head of Soriana, and 
the head of Jaramillo over here; the head of the guy who invented cars, the guy 
who invented airplanes, and the guy who invented televisions. No one is the same. 
No one does the same thing in the same way. [But now] the whole world is coming 
out of one head, and from that head you’re getting everything. It’s happening all 
over Mexico with these stores like Wal-Mart and McDonald’s, stores that came 
out of the head of allá [there]. Down here, in Mexico, that head is developing all 
its thoughts. (Silverstein, 2005)
 By taking the codes of corporate invaders and mixing them with ironic jux-
tapositions, Mexicans maintain a critical distance that allows them to individuate 
in the face of branding’s mental tyranny. Remember, advertisers know that once 
an image has been placed in a person’s mind, you it can’t be taken out. This is the 
danger of the “head developing all its thoughts.” But rasquachismo is alive and 
well among Mexican punks. When I saw Mexico City’s premiere alternative music 
band Café Tecuba perform in New York City, the crowd’s folk taxonomy was decid-
edly more “real” than that of the prevailing hipster crowd I had seen at the Village 
Voice’s Siren Music Festival the day before. The Siren Music Festival’s Coney 
Island kitsch locale provided the backdrop for the predominantly white swarm of 
music fans that appropriated hip hop, punk, and White trash fashion, exhibiting 
all the signs of rebellion but possessing none it its content or perspective. This was 
evidenced by the uncritical presence of Budweiser, Army, and X-Box as ubiqui-
tous sponsors of the festival; nary a peep of protest from the cheap beer-drinking 
crowd. By contrast, at the Café Tacuba show immigrant youth, who are forced to 
live invisible lives in one of the most visually stimulating cities in the world, fully 
engaged satire as an instrument of mental mutiny. Several kids had the “Hecho 
en Mexico” (Made in Mexico) clothing label tattooed on the backs of their necks, 
while others slam danced with Mexican wrestler masks. You couldn’t tell if it was 
a rock concert or luche libre wrestling match (Mexican wrestling has long been 
associated with working class resistance). In the metropolis at the center of global 
marketing, Mexican youth asserted their identity by contextualizing it with grave 
humor and irony.
 In Mexico City, naco (“tacky” or “trashy”) is synonymous with cool. As one 
T-shirt company writes on its MySpace page (with misspellings intact),
Naco is originally a derogative term used by upper and middle class Mexicans to 
describe things and people they felt were way beneath them in terms of hipness, 
taste and economic status. It’s usually employed as a synonym for “poor & igno-
rant”, but Naco-ness knows no economic or educational boundaries. Naco-ness 
is about complete earnestness. The typical Naco is very passionate bout his/hers 
likes. They will argue for hours on end that Quiet Riot is, indeed, the best band 
ever, after Creedence Clearwater Revival, of course. Their dislikes are irrelevant. 
Naco-ness is a style that goes beyond kitsch, camp or plain old cheesiness. It is 
very spiritual in its acceptance of the Self, and so, if one’s Self wants to dress in 
unbuttoned brightly colored shiny shirts, skin-tight faded black jeans, gold chains, 
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white socks and black shoes, topped off by a magnificent mullet, so be it. Naco 
is more a state of mind. It’s more a self assured disregard for what others think 
is cool without being arrogant or closeminded. Naco-ness is about being your 
own person regardless of if you’re ever in the right or not. Ultimately, Naconess 
is about being yourself...8
Contrast this with Williamsburg, the Brooklyn neighborhood that has been at the 
center of contemporary American cool, which launched the everyman trailer trash look 
that has spread across American malls. The look is “keeping it real” by slumming in 
working class culture. Built into all these style strategies, the common denominator is 
a return to some sense of authenticity. Lowbrow and low tech, we seek eternal return 
to humbler, less technological times. Cohen one-ups them by building a character 
that’s a hybrid of an international class of hillbillies, recycling the clichés of incest 
and other prejudiced beliefs surrounding the global underclass, but also orienting 
us to a world that actually remains substantially divided among classes, culture and 
technological access. The need to mine the past for authenticity is to create a dialog 
with the present. Observes media critic Mark Andreyavek (2004),
In short, what emerges in the promise in new media is a tension very similar to 
that noted of by Walter Benjamin in his excavation of the prehistory of consumer 
capitalism in the nineteenth century: the way in which the promise of the future 
resonates with the unfulfilled desires of a mythical past—what he referred to as 
an ‘ur-past’… The deployment of the unfulfilled potential of the ur-past may have 
politically progressive potential, insofar as it offers an alternative to the given state 
of affairs, but as Benjamin’s own analysis suggests, it can also serve as an alibi for 
the self-proliferation and extension of the logic of the present. (p. 26)
Confuse and Conquer! 
 In addition to disinformation and propaganda in the service of our war economy, 
there is also the ambient vocabulary of advertising, our ubiquitous social and religious 
subjectivity more commonplace than church altars and frescos during the Italian 
Renaissance. Sadly, the cultural practices initiated by Gen X in the form of irony 
have been thoroughly incorporated by marketing. Consider the listless, droll voice 
of the male narrator that doesn’t care about anything, or the hapless male drinker 
of Bud Light who is perpetually perplexed and stupefied. It may be that postirony 
is the snarky aesthetic or wink-wink device for the ever “elusive” species of male 
consumers ages 16 to 34, AKA the mook. In short, the “mook” is a perpetual 13 
year-old with thriving libido, Dionysian appetite, and cash to spend. He is also the 
Narcissistic stereotype often conjured when critics attack MySpace and YouTube 
for being cesspools of fart jokes and frat boy drink fests. And guess what? Like the 
drunken college students in the RV featured in Borat, they are soon entering the work 
force, just in time to mount the crushed emotional syntax of knowledge work.
 One of the biggest disappointments concerning postirony is the demise of 
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culture jamming as a critical weapon against advertising, which is the act of taking 
the codes of marketing and aiming them back at themselves, a kind of pointing 
the mirror at the mirror technique. For example, a typical culture jam is defacing 
a billboard so that its meaning is completely reversed by rearranging its words or 
altering its image. Unfortunately, billboard “liberation” and guerrilla marketing 
are now common marketing techniques, and it has become impossible to tell what 
is social critique and what is a sales pitch anymore. There was a NBC billboard, 
for instance, that advertised the show Friends by displaying a picture of the show’s 
three actresses accompanied by the tagline, “Cute Anorexic Chicks.” Is this a femi-
nist media critique, or the “wink-wink” persuasion method that tells us, yeah we 
know this is bullshit, but buy the product anyway? This technique was also used 
in Sprite’s “Obey Your Thirst” campaign, which featured Sports stars mocking the 
idea that celebrities can convince consumers to buy something. 
 Additionally, these days it is very common to use deconstruction—a central 
pedagogical tool of media literacy—as an advertisement tool. A few examples 
include Sprite’s “sublymonal” TV spots that poke fun at subliminal advertising 
while doing it, and Fed-Ex ran a commercial in which it showed audiences how 
to construct a successful Super Bowl ad. In some ways this is a victory for human 
intelligence: advertisers know that people, especially youth, are increasingly skepti-
cal of the ad industry. People making ads, the primary practitioners of postirony, 
are probably the most cynical of the bunch. I take this as evidence that humans 
are not as stupid as we assume, and that advertising is less effective than cultural 
critics argue. But as the quote from the teen marketing conference explicitly states 
(“In a post-scarcity media world, there is no shortage of brands or media pipeline 
channels. Attention is the new scarcity”), the problem is the level of clutter that 
makes discussing such issues so difficult. You have to sift through so much crap to 
triangulate anything ethical. This may be the ultimate triumph of “camp.” Recalling 
Sontag’s (2001[1964]) discussion, she remarks that camp is a sensibility that one 
knows but cannot define. “To emphasize style is to slight content, or to introduce 
an attitude which is neutral with respect to content. It goes without saying that the 
Camp sensibility is disengaged, depoliticized—or at least apolitical” (p. 277). Be-
cause postirony is antipolitical in nature, it takes great skill to insert a “sensibility” 
of authenticity back into irony.
 One such strategy is tactical media, and though he may not be conscious of 
it, Cohen deploys it with ease. Tactical media are micro-political interventions, if 
you will. They are fluid activities that subvert through flexible and malleable forms. 
Consequently, there are many ways to define and create tactical media, which depend 
on the fundamental ambience of our society’s postmodern subjectivity, which is 
self-referential, reflexive and collaged; basically the “mash-up.” This is why Lovink 
(2003) states, “There is no need for globally recognizable signifiers. Instead, tactical 
media work with the basic, but difficult recognition of difference” (p.258). Cohen 
plays this difference most clearly with the technique of “solecism”—intentional 
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word distortions. Through wordplay he defuses newspeak’s snarky marketing 
language, as in the case of, “I am big like can of Pepsi,” in reference to his male 
girth. But also as a foreigner from a decidedly un-sexy, dead imperial backwater 
like Kazakhstan, he can play up the contrast for affect.
 With hoaxing as a prime technique, Borat’s pranking is a malleable cognitive 
weapon that navigates perception and prejudice. In an MTV saturated culture of 
Punk’d and Jackass, Cohen understands how discomfort engages our critical facul-
ties; it breaks us down emotionally. Admittedly, his characters make me squirm, 
especially Ali G. There have been times while watching him when I feel saddened 
by the manner in which he targets his victims. Yet Borat strikes us as a simple every-
man who is naively trying to find his way in the world. In other words, he is “us,” 
so we can project ourselves into his misadventure because in many ways we, too, 
are like country bumpkins when facing daily hypercapitalist mediation. The fact 
that he addresses us on camera is his way of garnering empathy, conversing with 
us because as the audience we inhabit the kitsch psychic realm of Kazakhstan. But 
in reality we’re actually citizens of “Americanistan,” some imagined nation that we 
occupy in our multimedia groupthink. 
 Borat is also an ambassador of reality TV. The film’s mockumentary style is 
a hybrid narrative documentary, partly scripted, partly improvised on-camera ac-
tion. Borat navigates this distorted zone of authenticity, much like the characters 
in reality game-docs who are half performing, half surviving the scripted desires 
of the show’s producers. As many commentators of reality TV haves stated, this is 
partly a way for us to process and normalize living in an increasingly surveilled 
world. Shows like Survivor are also forums that help us cope with the experience 
of being mediated at the workplace. Trump’s The Apprentice is the penultimate 
example of this trend. The mistake most critics make is that they identify the 
realms depicted on these programs as fake. I’d venture to say they are no more 
artificial than our daily lives when we perform a variety of roles as students, 
employees, citizens, and the public. The difference is a degree of surveillance 
and amplification.
 What Borat does is remediate that experience by incorporating reality TV’s 
aesthetic practices, but then hybridizes them further with physical comedy and so-
cial commentary (recall that the first show he sees on his hotel television is Cops). 
Imagine if such situations were exploited on shows like The Simple Life starring 
Paris Hilton and Nicole Richie. If you examine the subtext of that program, which 
in many ways is the reverse of Borat (for in their case it’s the city sophisticates 
who visit “backwards” rural America), what you actually see is a very conserva-
tive ideological agenda in keeping with the show’s host network, Fox Network. 
In the case of the city girls, they are ultimately the fools with no moral compass 
or values, precisely the opposite of Cohen’s character. Though Borat is a flawed 
human, especially in his views of women and Jews, he has a distinct view of the 
world. In the end he realizes his infatuation with Pamela Anderson is based on il-
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lusions, and instead falls in love with a woman who is the antithesis of Anderson’s 
hypermediated personae. 
 Cohen also remediates the idea of a TV journalist. This is particularly evident 
when he appears on the local morning news program and violates every conven-
tion of etiquette, protocol, and respect for the medium, including breaching camera 
position and the pre-defined spaces of the TV studio. He mocks the self-importance 
that media stake in our world. Also, Cohen’s ability to navigate postirony makes 
him a more effective reporter than Michael Moore. Though Moore’s shtick has been 
somewhat useful in bringing important issues to the for, there is a certain pomposity 
that is out of step with the culture of postirony; postironists are too self-absorbed 
to incorporate an ego as large as Moore’s. Borat’s character is a true clown, his 
mustache a stand-in for whiteface (and a bit of a Groucho Marx rerun as well), and 
in doing so it becomes easier to insert ourselves as protagonists on his pilgrimage. 
This is bit like the theory of cartooning: the more general and simple your lines 
(such as Peanuts), the easier it is to project your imagination. The more detailed, 
such as superhero comics, are for older audiences who have less imagination than 
little kids. This is also in keeping with McLuhan’s theory of hot and cool media. 
Moore is a “hot,” well-defined character needing less interaction, whereas Borat 
is “cool”; he engages more senses. 
 In another gesture to postirony, Borat must be unbearably uncool to be cool. 
This is reminiscent of the cultural trend to mine ‘80s’ nerd culture with movies like 
Napoleon Dynamite. As mentioned in the discussion of the “ur-past,” it’s not just 
a postmodern practice anymore to recycle the past; there is an effort to inhabit it. 
Uncle Rico in Napoleon Dynamite, for example, explicitly orders a time machine 
to reenter ancient times of media lore. In Borat’s case you can do so through the 
film, or his Web site, which is the design antithesis of Web 2.0. 
 Just as the Borat film’s graphics begin with footage from an imaginary scratched 
propaganda film, it concludes with his return to “Kazakhstan” where villagers now 
own iPods. A laptop sits prominently on the table where Borat’s cassette-playing 
boombox was before. Though he’s displaying technological cool as a sign of civi-
lized advancement, at the same time he rejects Pamela Anderson’s “plastic” for a 
more “authentic” women in the guise of an African American, overweight prostitute 
(the ultimate social pariah as we learn when he invites her to be his guest at the 
Southern etiquette dinner). In doing so, Borat’s “cultural learnings” is trying to 
make our mediated culture more humane by inserting “authentic” humans into the 
mix. As for the poor souls of “Kazakhstan” who’ll eventually enter the knowledge 
work economy, may they do so with an ironic rich diet.
Postscript
 There is a disheartening downside to all the Borat hype. When the Halloween 
parade in Greenwich Village coincided with the release of Borat, that night there 
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were dozens of Borat doppelgangers roaming among the revelers, and the movie’s 
infamous ice cream truck was one of the parade’s floats. Did I see Cohen, or just one 
of his many apparitions flirting with the crowd? I also encountered several costumed 
revelers dressed as Dr. Seuss’ “Star-Belly Sneetches.” You may recall the story about 
conformity in which legions of Sneetches compete to outdo each other with body 
modifications in order to stick out from the crowd. With dozens of Borats roving the 
Village, would the Cohen character cease to stand out or get obscured as so much 
cultural product does in our media saturated world? Only truthiness will tell.
Notes
 1 Orwell, George (1990[1949]), p. 214.
 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truthiness
 3 KlaxonCow, fifth paragraph, Feb. 19, 2007 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qCK
wPobh1EA&eurl=, 
 4 http://whatteenswant.com/whatteens/index.jsp
 5 http://journals.democraticunderground.com/Plaid%20Adder/101, paragraph 8, 2/28/06
 6 http://journals.democraticunderground.com/Plaid%20Adder/101, paragraph 6, 2/28/06
 7 I can’t help but think of Hummer H2 ads that repeatedly depict the earth as an alien 
landscape in which cars, served by new humans, must inhabit. The SUV is a kind of fugi-
tive pose against global warming and vagrancies of impending disaster brought on by the 
onset of capitalism. Not surprisingly, the majority of these ads target women, not just female 
drivers, but also to “nag” the family patriarch into obtaining them.
 8 http://www.myspace.com/usanaco
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